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On the reduction of nuclear weapons 
The United States, in 1946, proposed 
that an international authority be 
formed to control the dangerous 
parts of atomic energy. The proposal 
mC1 wilh very little success. except to 
lead to the conclusion that there v•as 
no apparent re.ason Y<'hY it was not 
technically feasible. Discussions on 
nuclear \veapons testing. initiated in 
1958, reached some agreement on test 
restrictions in Subsequent years. 
The intervening years have been 
notable for the development both ·by 
the United States and the Soviet 
Union (and later by other nations) or 
thermonuclear wcapOns with yields 
up to I ,<XlO times larger than those of 
the weapons used at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. More recently, in the 
SALT 1 disc-us.sions, weapons control 
was considered; and in SALT 11, some 
measure of undcrslanding on stra· 
tegic launch vehicles limitations was 
reached, resulting in the as yet 
unratified SALT u treaty. 
The. international stockpile of 
nuc.lear weapons of various degrees 
of lclhality and yield is now common· 
ly referred to as 50,000 nuclear 
weapons. Considering the casualties 
and damage at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki caused by two relatively 
low~yield fission weapons, the effects 
which would result from these 
weapons is beyond imagination. No 
satisfactory defense against nuclear 
weapons has been found. An attack 
on weapons in fixed silos or sub-
marines in port can be made with ac. 
curacy, but it seems cer~ain that a 
nuclear attack would be followed by a 
vigorous and devastating nuclear 
rcs-ponsc by either the United States 
or the Soviet Union, because of the 
redundancy of their relatively sur· 
vivable strategic systems. 
The recent attack on an lraqi 
nuclear reactor makes it clear that 
potential nuclear capability by an 
avo\\'ed enemy has led-and can 
a.gain lead- to a preemptive strike. 
This was the first such occasion but it 
probably will not be the last. 
We in the United St.ates arc now in 
the pasition or having provided the 
planes that made the attack on a 
nuclear reactor that was constructed 
with French help and guidance. It is a 
first and an unpleasant one, bolh on 
the score of the French invoJvement 
and of the Israeli attack conducted en. 
tireJy on the.Ir own initiative. Report-
edly, the destroyed reactor had been 
duly inspected by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. The Israelis 
were apparently unimpressed, claim-
ing there was provision at the Iraqi site 
for separation of plutonium frorn the 
reactor material. 
Most of the S0.000 nuclear weapons 
arc now in the hands of the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Both Brit-
ain and France have sizable and effec-
tive but much smaller stocks. The 
Chinese have nuclear weapons and 
delivery vehicles of publicly unknown 
number and quality. but probably 
small compared to the United States 
and t-hc Soviet Union. India bas ex-
ploded a bomb and may have some 
others. Several nations which have not 
exploded bombs probably have mod-
est stocks of weapons. In recent years 
more nations have joined this latter 
group, and it seems ljkely that the 
number or nations capable or produc-
ing nuclear weapons wiJJ increase in 
this decade. If this happens and if 
nuclear material-especially pluto· 
nium- for bombs is easily available, 
sonte of the cec.hnically strong nations 
that have disavO\\'ed nuclear weapans 
may change their policies. Unless some 
move is made soon to reduce stocks of 
nuclear weapons. the probability o f 
their use, ·whether by accident or 
design, will be greatly increased. 
In view of this ominous situation it is 
imperatii.·e to find some ne"' ways of 
rapprochement. Reduction of stocks 
directly by the United States and the 
Soviet Union seems to be the only way 
to get started. Moves through the 
United Nations have been made for 35 
years, yet stockpiles and proliferation 
are on the rise. If the United States and 
the Soviet Union would actually start 
some reduction, it could have major 
effect: 
• Other nations might be per-
suaded to join. 
• Collaboration, even on a small 
scale as a start. might greatly decrease 
the probability that the United States 
and the Soviet Union would find 
themselves in confrontation with each 
other as a result of third· party action. 
On the occasion of receiving the 
Albert Einstein Peace Prize, George 
Kennan gave a moving address on the 
dangers of the escalating nuclear 
weapQns situation. He spoke strong· 
ly, even prior to the Israeli attack on 
the Iraqi nuclear re.actor, about the 
seriousness of the present situation. 
Kennan made the suggestion that 
"the President ... after due con· 
sultation with the Congress .. . pro· 
pose to the Soviet government an 
immediate acrosswthe-board reduc· 
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tion by 50 percent of the nuclear 
arsenals now being maintained by 
the two superpowers-a reduction 
affecting in equal measure all forms 
of Lhe weapon, strategic, medium. 
range, and tactical as well as all 
means of their delive,ry-all I.his 10 
be implemented at once and without 
further 'vrangling among the ex· 
pens, and to be subject to such na· 
tional means of verification as now 
)je at the disposal of the l"'O 
PO\\'Crs." 
Kennan proposed further reduction,s 
at a later t:imc but made no mention 
of conditions for participation of 
other po,vcrs. No reference was made 
to the United Nations. 
This is a powerful proposal. 
Somewhat similar ones have been 
rnade in desperatio1i by workers in 
this field before, but with no hope 
that anyone would take them serious-
ly. But Kennan is very serious. This 
appeal goes fu rther than one that he 
made several years ago. He puts the 
propQsal entirely on a t\vo-nation 
basis and emphasize,s the need ror 
rapid movement. 
One reason that such a dramatic 
suggestion might now be acceptable as 
an objective to the United States and 
the Soviet Union is that the nuclear 
stockpiles and delivery systems arc so 
Jarge t hat a reduction to one-half 
would still leave each supe.rpower with 
an overwhe1ming force. Although the 
SO percent reduction would not solve 
the nuclear disarmament problem it 
would be a start. Kennan suggests that 
after this initial move there should be a 
further reduction by two-thirds and, 
presumably. others to come. 
Kennan's prope>sal for a 50 perce1u 
reduction initially is one which would 
shock both U.S. and Soviet military 
personnel, who would probably op· 
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pose it vigorously. But such a drastic 
reduction may not be necessary to get 
the prO<.'l!s.s started. 
Ins tead of making a 50 percent 
reduction in a single move, ii " 'ould 
perhaps be more effective lO do it in 
several steps. The first could be entire-
ly bilateral. involving only the United 
Stales and 1hc Soviet Union, and for a 
more modest 5 or IOpercent. For such 
a decrease it "'·ould mauer less just 
which weapons on each side were 
reduced, and therefore il shouJd be 
easier to come lO an agreement. The 
objective would be to get the reduction 
starred by both nations. 
It " 'ould be highly desirable to have 
other nations ""ith nuclear armaments 
participating in an agreentent for 
weaJ>()ns reduction to some reasonable 
level. But making this a provis ion for 
starting has serious disadvantages and 
leads to inte-nninable delays . Provi· 
sion should be made, ho"·ever, towel· 
come other nuc1ear po,vers as adher-
ents. Sufficiently complete nuclear 
di$Armament cannot be achieved wilh· 
out participation of a11 nuclear 
powers, but adherence of other na· 
tions should not be a condition for in-
itiating 1he reduction. 
The Kennan prop0sal seems to gi"·e 
inadequate encouragement or ration· 
ale for other nuclear weapons states to 
join the superpowers. Perhaps to 
achieve this a further and stronger step 
is necessary. One proposal is fo r the 
United States and the Soviet Union to 
agree that, in addition to their own 
reduc1ions, they would immediately 
consult with each other in any situa. 
tion in which nuclear y,·eapons might 
be used or newly developed by others. 
They would then report the reasons for 
their concern to the l_nternational 
Atomic Energy Agency. In this Agen· 
cy bolh powers have a record or par-
ticipation and reasonable agreement. 
The degree to which the United States 
and the Soviet Union would act to· 
gether would not be s pecified in ad-
vance. 
AJong with a joint agreement to 
rcdu<.'(: their nuclear weapons by half, 
in s1agcs, there would be a basis for 
continued consultation and joint ac· 
tion. The history o f the past 20 years 
seems to make it reasonably unlikely 
that either the United States or the 
Soviet Union would, indepe-ndently 
and without nuclear action involving 
other nations, nlake a frontal auack 
on the other. The prospect of devasutt-
ing retaliation in either direct ion so far 
has been a strong deterrent. It is 
therefore very much in the interest of 
both nations to minimize the chance 
tha1 other nations would start a con-
flagration that might involve the 
United Sta tes and the Soviet Union on 
opposite sides. 
It is noteworthy that the Soviet 
Union has, so far as is known public-
ly, been meticulous in the handling of 
nuclear weapons by other members of 
the Soviet bloc and in the processing 
o f spenl reactor fuel which might put 
other members in possession of "'ea~ 
pons material. Co1npared to the 
Soviet bloc the rest of the world is 
chaoLic in regard to control. Britain 
and France and their nuclear reactor 
partners, as "''Cll as Japan .• turned 
down the U.S. proposal not to re-
process spent fuel until arrangements 
for international control or some ar· 
rangeme-nt for joint processing could 
be set up. Those nations arc going 
ahead with plans to separate 
plutonium from spen1 reactor fue1. 
and to use il. These recent happenings 
make it clear that the place to achieve 
some international agreement is 
directly with the Soviet Union. 
In the past the Soviet Union has 
never take-0 any real action that 
would make it seem likely that they 
would look with favor either on Ken. 
nan's proposal or on that proposed 
here. Moscow agreed to SAi.. T 1 and to 
SALT 11 and Washington has a.greed to 
SALT 1 but hai; not yet ratified SA1,.T 11 
although the Soviet Union has been 
pressing for agreement. SALT 11 does 
not go very far and our reticence to 
sign the treaty has been used cffcc~ 
tively by the Soviets to put us in the 
position of not going along with even 
a relatively weak control agreement. 
Let us now propose specific cuts of 
S percent in current nuclear weapon 
systems-and start to make them. 
This would not " 'ea.ken our deterrent 
capability appreciably. Let us then 
propose to the Soviet Union that they 
make simiJar cuts in their nuclear 
weapon systems. Aflcr this process is 
well started, the United States and the 
Soviet Union should begin negotia-
tions as to ho"' further cuts could 
be agreed upon and made up to Ken-
nan's SO percent as an initial goal. Let 
us also propose that the agenda in-
clude an exchange of vic,vs on nuclear 
weapons in the hands of other na-
tions. and that there should be an 
agreement to consult togelher im-
mediately ir either nation rinds 
evidence or preparation ror nuclear 
aggression, or evidence or nuclear 
weapon production. in hitherto 
unknown programs. And further. 
afler the Uniled States and the Soviet 
Union have each made their initial 
step of 5 percent reduction, both 
should "'elcome the adherence and 
participation Of Other nuclear PO\.\'ers 
in the weapons reduction program. 
Many in the United States would 
feel strongly that such a step \VOuld be 
wildly dangerous. But if the full SO 
percent reduction proposed by Ken-
nan were taken in stages and in a " 'ay 
to be mutually verified, the danger 
would decrease rather than increase. 
If real reduction in nuclear arma-
ments were achieved by an agreed 
procedure. the tension bet,veen lhe 
superpowers could only decrease. 
Furthermore, real pressure could be 
brought on other nuclear powers and 
on potential nuclear pov1ers to pursue 
a similar if not identical policy. 
The principal difference in this pro-
cedure compared to past suggestions 
is that so111e action "'·ou/d be taken 
early, not delayed until after discus-
sion by a large number of nations 
" ' ith quite different nuclear 
capabilhies. 
Many in the United Stales would 
undoubtedly feel that it is a waste of 
time, given Russian and SO\'iet 
history, to pursue a course that \\'Ould 
depend upon their reduction of ar-
maments. There are at least two 
points against this view: one is that 
recent Soviet military steps relating LO 
nuclear armament do not indicate 
that they see an effective means of 
nuclear defense. This is a new situa-
tion. It is true that they have greatly 
strengthened their position relative to 
the West in the past fe\v years and this 
is a policy " 'e cannot overlook for 
long. But che.y also are vulnerable. 
The other paint is that, in the Eastern 
bloc, they have kept nuclear weap0ns 
control and manu facture to 
themselves. When it became clear 
that they could not control Chinese 
nuclear exploitation they immediately 
withdrew their supPQrt. China is a 
source of greater danger ror them 
than for us. 
If we act together with the Sovie.ts 
in nuclear "'eapons reduction and 
control it would greatly complicate 
our evolving relations \Vith China. 
The Chinese have shown no interest 
in arms control largely because of 
their fear of Russia. This fear was 
very likely a major motivation toward 
more friendly relations with the 
Uniled States. If lhe United States 
and the Soviet Union agreed not only 
to reduce nuclear weapons but to con-
sult and possibly act together with 
respect to international nuclear prob-
lems, the strongest objections would 
probably come from the Chinese. 
But, whiJe China's nuclear forces are 
growing, they are still very small com~ 
pared to those of the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Recognizing 
this, China might be pleased to sec 
nuclear weapons diminish in number. 
Ed itorial 
especially those in So\•iet hands. 
Thus, China might be prepared to 
consider a freeze at present le\'els, 
leading to reduction after significant 
United States and Soviet reductions 
were made. Having an "adequate" 
nuclear capability in a world where 
stronger nuclear powers are pressing 
for reduclion by all is not an enviable 
posit.ion. 
It seems best, considering the record 
of the past 35 years, to proceed directly 
\vith a proposal to the SovieL Union. 
This could be couched in 1erms of a 
statement o f initial reductions lo be 
made by the United States and a pro-
posal that the Soviet Union do 
likewise. Most important should be a 
proposal for discussions aimed at fur-
ther reductions and, after this, the 
enlistment o r other nuclear powers to 
follo\v suit . 
There is probably not much chance 
that the present pattern of negotia-
tions established in SALT l and 11 will 
gel anywhere. Something different is 
needed. Rccen1 decisions in Europe to 
go ahead " 'ith plutonium production 
and separation arc probably in part 
due to lack of confidence in the United 
States. \Ve need a ne\v policy that puts 
us once again in the lead in our ad-
vocacy of nuclear "'capons reduction 
and international control. 0 
Robert F. Bacher ls profes.sor or physics 
emeritus at the California Institute of 
Technoloa.Y in Pasadena (91109). Bacher 
v.·as a member of the faculty at Cornell 
University from 1935 to 1949, and \.\'Orkcd 
at Los Alamos from 
1943 to 194S. He 
served as a member 
o( the first Atomic 
Energy Commission 
(1946-t949). Bacher 
joined the faculty at Caltech in 1949, 
and \\'as pro\•ost from 1962 to 1970. He 
\\'as a member of the P resident 's Science 
Advisory Committee from 1957 to 1960, 
and ts a founding sponsor of the Bulletin. 
November 1981 The Bulledn of the Atomic Scientists S 
